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 Self-Trust and the Diversity of Religions
Linda Zagzebski
I.  The problem of religious disagreement 
The diversity of religions is widely regarded as one of the most serious problems 
for conscientious belief in a particular religion, both among ordinary people 
and among professional philosophers. The problem is not unique to religious 
belief because people have the same reaction to any instance of irresolvable 
disagreement. I think it is illuminating that this is not just a philosopher’s 
puzzle. If the philosophically untutored think of it, that probably means there 
is something in ordinary beliefs and experiences that generates the problem. 
But since few, if any, people worried about it for millennia, those beliefs and 
experiences are probably modern in origin.
There are two modern sources of the perception that diversity is a threat. 
One is a principle about human nature that I believe we should reject, but 
the other is a kind of experience that we ought to take very seriously. I will 
argue that we should trust the experiences that generate the problem because 
of self-trust, and I think that the way out of the problem requires us to look 
more deeply at what self-trust commits us to.
At some time in the distant past, people probably began to realize that some 
of their most cherished beliefs conflicted with the beliefs of other groups of 
people, but for many centuries, nobody saw this as a problem for their own 
beliefs. They simply responded by saying, “We are right, and they disagree with 
us, so they are wrong, and that’s the end of that.” And some people still take 
that line. (And there are people who wouldn’t dream of taking that line about 
religion who don’t hesitate to take that line about other things, such as politics).
However, we are past the time when we can take this line in good faith. 
Ever since the much-maligned Enlightenment, the perception of the world 
in the West has changed irreversibly. People gave up the idea that each of 
us can treat our own point of view as epistemically privileged just because 
it is our own. The story of why we did that is interesting because I think it 
combines both an important advance in human sensibilities with at least one 
philosophical mistake. 
An important assumption governing much of Enlightenment philosophy is 
intellectual egalitarianism, a position endorsed by John Locke.1  The idea is that 
all normal human beings are roughly equal in the capacity to get knowledge. 
Aside from the fact that some have acquired greater expertise or have greater 
access to information in some fields, there are no epistemic elites. Given this 
assumption, I am not being epistemically honest if I treat my own viewpoint as 
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privileged. Locke combined his egalitarianism with optimism about the human 
ability to get knowledge, but there is a pessimistic interpretation that also comes 
from the Enlightenment. We could think of subjective points of view as equally 
bad ways to get the truth. All of them are limited and distorted, so it does no 
good to replace your own perspective with someone else’s, equally limited and 
distorted. Notoriously, the Enlightenment enshrined the perspective of the 
impartial observer, a being without culture or history or personal preferences. 
But we also know that there are many disagreements in belief that cannot be 
resolved from such a perspective. If a conflict in belief can be resolved neither 
from the impartial perspective nor from the point of view of the disputants, 
and if I accept epistemic egalitarianism, I have to admit that my belief is no 
more likely to be true than the belief of my opponent. A conscientious believer 
finds this bothersome. Let me call this the Enlightenment worry:’Irresolvable 
disagreement over a belief threatens the conscientiousness of the belief.   
The Enlightenment worry is unstable for at least two reasons. One is that 
conscientiousness in belief has two aspects, only one of which is expressed in 
the worry over irresolvable disagreement. If we think disagreement threatens 
the conscientiousness of our beliefs, it is because we think that disagreement 
makes our own beliefs less likely to be true, and we might think we can escape 
the perceived threat to the truth of our belief if we withhold belief– neither 
believe nor disbelieve. But if we do that, we violate another demand of 
conscientiousness. A conscientious believer not only desires that the beliefs she 
has are true, she also desires to acquire beliefs in the domains she cares about 
as conscientiously as she can. To deny ourselves beliefs in important domains 
denies us important elements of a desirable life. People who do not have beliefs 
in important domains, who turn away from ultimate questions, tend to be 
shallow people. So one source of the instability of the Enlightenment worry 
is that it reflects one of the demands of conscientious belief but not the other.
There is another problem with the Enlightenment worry. The truth is, most 
of us are not epistemic egalitarians, and we would be hard pressed to defend 
egalitarianism if we wanted to. In particular, I don’t think many of us worry 
about disagreements with people whom we do not admire. If you believe acts 
of terrorism or genocide are wrong (by whatever definition you want), I doubt 
that you think the conscientiousness of your belief is threatened when you find 
out there are people who disagree, even though you are not likely to resolve the 
conflict by talking it over with them. If you think that it is a bad idea to devote 
your life primarily to acquiring money and fame, I doubt that it will bother you 
to find out that there are people who think the contrary. Nor should it. What 
really bothers us, I think, is that we recognize admirable people among those 
who believe differently than we do about certain things and we observe that 
the beliefs of different exemplars conflict with each other. The exemplars I have 
in mind are people who have a sense of the importance of certain domains of 
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life and the beliefs needed to sustain those domains, and who are epistemically 
admirable in the way they believe as well as in the way they act.2
This version of the disagreement worry is also modern because sympathetic 
contact between people of different cultures only occurred on a large scale in 
the last few hundred years. That experience, I think, is much more important 
than the Enlightenment principles that allegedly threaten the conscientiousness 
of our beliefs.  When we have direct and sympathetic contact with people of 
another culture, it is almost impossible not to notice that many of them are 
as admirable as the most admirable people in our own culture. So my position 
is that it is not irresolvable disagreement per se that causes a problem. What 
really worries us is irresolvable disagreement among people whom we admire 
and between people we admire and ourselves.
This form of the problem would not be threatening unless we ought to trust 
our emotion of admiration, and I think that we not only ought to, but have 




Richard Foley argues in his book, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), that any normal, non-skeptical life will 
have to include a significant degree of self-trust in our intellectual faculties, 
procedures, and opinions (99). The reason is that any defense of our most 
fundamental faculties and opinions will make use of those same faculties and 
opinions, so there are no non-question-begging guarantees of our own reliability. 
For example, we test our memory by perception, we test one perception by 
another perception, we test much of what we believe by consulting other people, 
so we use beliefs about them to test other beliefs, and so on. There is no way 
to get out of the circle of our faculties and opinions to test the reliability of 
the opinions and faculties in the circle.
Foley prefaces his observation about the need for self-trust with the claim 
that there is no answer to the radical skeptic and the project of classical 
foundationalism has failed. The proper reaction to that, he says, is to accept 
it and to acknowledge the consequence that intellectual inquiry always 
involves a substantial element of trust in our own faculties and the opinions 
they generate. But I think we need not accept Foley’s contention that there 
is no answer to the radical skeptic in order to agree with his view on the need 
for self-trust. There are many kinds and degrees of skepticism, and no matter 
what you think of global skepticism, we are still left with concerns about the 
reliability of our faculties and the trustworthiness of our beliefs, and Foley’s 
point about the lack of non-circular tests for our reliability seems to me to be 
justified independent of his views on global skepticism.
4
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Foley gives an interesting argument that self-trust logically commits us to 
trust in others. He begins by defining three positions with respect to epistemic 
trust, each of which has an ethical analogue (85-89).3 The first is epistemic 
universalism. According to the epistemic universalist, the fact that someone else 
has a belief gives me some reason to believe it. That reason may be outweighed by 
other reasons; nonetheless, the fact that another person has a certain belief 
is a mark in favor of its credibility. The ethical analogue is the position that 
the interests and goals of other persons always count morally for me. Again, 
they can be outweighed by some other value, but they should always count in 
my deliberations.
What Foley calls egoists and egotists reject univeralism. The epistemic egoist 
maintains that the fact that someone else has a belief can be a reason for me to believe 
it, but only if I have evidence that the person is reliable, that is, I have evidence that 
her beliefs will further my desire for the truth. So I may believe what another person 
believes on her say-so, but only because I have information that her beliefs are 
reliably calibrated with truth in the domain in which she is making the claim.
This view also has an ethical analogue. The ethical egoist says I may care 
about the interests of others, but only when I adopt their interests as my 
own interests. The egoist insists that I am under no obligation to care about 
somebody else’s interests, and I am not irrational if I do not. But sometimes 
I take an interest in their interests. Similarly, the epistemic egoist says that I 
am not irrational if I pay no attention to what another person believes, but 
sometimes I see for myself that what she believes serves my interest in getting 
the truth because I see for myself that she is reliable. So notice that for both 
kinds of egoist I have no reason to pay attention to what somebody else says 
or to their interests unless I see that what they say serves my interests; I see 
(or decide) that their interests are my interests.
The most extreme position identified by Foley is epistemic egotism (86). 
Epistemic egotists maintain that it is never rational to grant credibility to the opinions 
of others simply because it is their opinion. The only legitimate way for someone 
else to influence my beliefs is through Socratic demonstration. Anyone who 
wants to convince me of her belief must demonstrate to me that, given what I 
already believe, her opinion is one I ought to adopt, but it is never reasonable 
for me to believe what she believes on her say-so.
This is the analogue of ethical egotism, the view that I should not adopt 
the interests of others as my interests just because they are their interests. If I 
act in the interest of others, that is because my interests and theirs happen to 
coincide, but the mere fact that something is in their interests ought to play 
no part in my deliberations. Similarly, the epistemic egotist says that I might 
believe what somebody else believes, but the fact that she believes it ought to 
play no part in my reasons for believing it.
Now Foley argues that self-trust makes both epistemic egoism and epistemic 
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egotism incoherent. Because of the social construction of belief, if we have 
basic trust in our own opinions and intellectual faculties, we cannot coherently 
withhold trust from others because in so far as the opinions of others have 
shaped our own opinions, we would not be reliable unless they are. And this 
trust is not limited to people who preceded us historically. If our contemporaries 
were shaped by many of the same conditions that shaped us, then on pain of 
inconsistency, if I trust myself, I should trust them.
But Foley does not stop there. He argues that even though we tend to be 
fascinated with differences between people and we like to exaggerate them, 
there are many more commonalities than differences in human faculties and 
environment. In fact, the similarities extend to people all over the world at 
all times. So the fact that some person somewhere at some time has a certain 
belief gives me some reason to believe it myself, given that I have trust in 
myself and I am relevantly similar to them. Self-trust therefore commits me to 
universalism (103), but notice that Foley assumes epistemic egalitarianism to 
get the conclusion. Self-trust, together with epistemic egalitarianism, requires 
me to accept epistemic universalism. The conclusion is that given that I have 
reason to believe that someone else believes p, I have at least a weak reason to 
believe p myself. I do not need to know anything special about the reliability 
of the person. (105) Self-trust commits me to trust others unless I have reason 
to think they are unreliable. I need special reason not to trust them. I do not 
need special reason to trust them.
Now suppose that I have a belief that conflicts with the belief of another. 
Foley argues that my belief defeats the belief of the other person because by my 
lights the other person has been unreliable (108). Since it is trust in myself that 
creates in me a presumption of trust in another, then unless I have evidence 
that the other person is more reliable than I am (e.g., the other person is a 
medical specialist and I am not), my trust in that other is defeated by my trust 
in myself. Notice first that the fact that  someone else has a belief that conflicts 
with one of mine is not evidence that the other person is unreliable. After all, it 
is only a single case. But more importantly, notice that Foley’s treatment of the 
conflict case makes him an epistemic egoist in such cases, although he does not 
say that in his book. In order to trust the other person, I need evidence that he 
is more reliable than I am, but I do not need evidence that I am more reliable 
than he is in order to trust myself. That is epistemic egoism. Yet according to 
his own argument, I would not be reliable unless the other is.4
Foley says nothing about religion in his book, but we can easily apply his 
points to religious belief. The religious epistemic egotist would be a person who 
accepts no religious belief on the word of another. He expects a demonstration 
of the existence of God that uses premises he accepts himself, and he will accept 
the beliefs of a particular religion only if the same conditions can be satisfied 
for each doctrine of the religion. It is very unlikely that these conditions can 
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be satisfied by any religion. Theism might satisfy these conditions for some 
people and atheism for others, whereas still others will be convinced neither by 
arguments for atheism nor by arguments for theism and will become agnostic. 
Religious epistemic egotism puts the agnostic in the position of either caring 
very much about a domain about which he does not have conscientiously 
acquired beliefs, thereby violating one of the demands of conscientiousness 
I mentioned earlier, or perhaps more likely, it leads him to cease to care. I 
suspect that many contemporary atheists and agnostics satisfy this definition 
of a religious epistemic egotist.
The less extreme religious epistemic egoist will accept religious beliefs on the 
word of another provided that there is good evidence of the reliability of the 
source. John Locke is an epistemic egoist about belief in Christianity. Locke 
defines Revelation as a communication from God, and faith as the acceptance of 
beliefs on the word of God.5 Locke says we have good evidence that the Gospels 
are a communication from God, given the miracles performed by Jesus.  We 
have reason to believe the miracles occurred in the same way we have reason 
to believe testimony about other historical occurrences. Miracles are evidence 
that the source of the teachings of Jesus is divine, and hence, is reliable.
 For the egoist, belief in particular Christian teachings does not require 
demonstration of the content of the revelation, as it does for the egotist. But 
reason judges whether something is a revelation, that is, whether it is reliable. 
And Locke allows that it can be rational to believe a revelation even when 
the content is improbable. He says that is to be expected since revelation is 
about matters above the limit of our faculties to attain on our own, such as 
the revelation that the angels rebelled against God.
 I think Foley is correct that epistemic egotism and epistemic egoism are not 
coherent positions, given that we have self-trust, and his argument applies to 
religious epistemic egotism and egoism. I think this is an interesting consequence 
because both positions are so common. But given Foley’s egalitarianism, the 
only option left is universalism, so the position to which we are committed by 
self-trust, according to Foley’s argument, is religious epistemic universalism. The 
religious epistemic universalist would grant prima facie credence to the religious 
beliefs of all other persons.
 I find Foley’s approach to self-trust generally helpful, but unfortunately, I 
don’t think it is helpful in giving the conscientious believer guidance in cases of 
conflict. For people who already have religious beliefs (or anti-religious beliefs), 
self-trust means that my own belief trumps the belief of others, assuming I am 
being careful. I assume they are unreliable because they disagree with me, and 
as I’ve said, this view reduces to epistemic egoism. Furthermore, I think it is 
too much like the’“I’m right so they must be wrong” view that I’ve said we 
can no longer support.
What about cases in which a person is agnostic in religious matters? In 
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that case Foley’s position also is not very helpful because the agnostic can’t 
choose between conflicting religious beliefs without evidence of the relative 
reliability of one group over another – atheists, deists, Christians, Buddhists, 
etc. —in order to adjudicate the conflict, and it’s not likely that she is going 
to get that. So Foley’s approach is not helpful whether or not a person already 
has religious beliefs. Still, I think a closer look at self-trust reveals something 
interesting both about the source of the worry over religious diversity and the 
way a person who trusts herself ought to proceed.
III.  Emotional self-trust and conflict
In my judgment Foley is right that any non-skeptical intellectual life must 
include a substantial amount of self-trust in whatever aspects of ourselves produce 
or support our beliefs. What those aspects are depends upon the nature of the self 
and what you think that is is one of the things you need to trust. Foley limits 
the aspects of the self  that are relevant to epistemic self-trust to cognitive and 
perceptual faculties and a set of beliefs one already has, but I think they must 
include more than that. Foley does not mention emotions, but I think we must 
trust our emotions for the same reason we must trust our perceptual faculties, 
memory, and beliefs. Emotion dispositions can be reliable or unreliable and 
particular emotions may fit or not fit their objects. But we can’t tell whether 
our emotion dispositions are reliable without using those same dispositions in 
conjunction with our other faculties. How can we tell whether our disposition 
to pity is reliably directed at the pitiful, whether our disposition to disgust is 
reliably directed towards the disgusting, whether we reliably fear the fearsome, 
or admire the admirable without appealing to further emotions? We trust what 
we think we see when we take a hard look in good environmental conditions, 
and if others agree, we take that as confirmation. Similarly, we trust what we 
feel when we feel admiration or pity or revulsion and we take the agreement 
of others as confirmation. So the grounds for trusting our emotions are parallel 
to the grounds for trusting our perceptions and memory.
Emotions are the ground of many beliefs that lead to action, so trust in those 
beliefs depends upon trusting an emotion. Fear of a situation grounds the belief 
that I ought to escape. Compassion for a person grounds the belief that we 
ought to give her aid. Respect for a person grounds the belief that we may not 
treat her in certain ways, and so on. So the self-trust we need in order to act 
requires trust in beliefs that depend upon trust in emotions. If epistemic self-
trust includes trust in the beliefs that ground action, then epistemic self-trust 
requires emotional self-trust.  It follows that to live a normal, non-skeptical life 
we need to trust our emotions as well as our faculties, procedures, and beliefs. 
Our emotions are therefore within the set of faculties, procedures, and beliefs 
whose reliability we need to depend upon but whose reliability we cannot test 
Self-Trust and the Diversity of Religions     69
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in a non-circular way.
Foley says that we need to trust the beliefs we have that we acquired at some 
time in the distant past that we can’t remember. And he concludes from that 
that we must trust the people from whom we acquired those beliefs. But more 
follows from that observation as well. Many beliefs are not just passed along 
from one person to the next like a virus. Beliefs are imbedded in traditions from 
which we both acquire and learn how to interpret the beliefs, so trusting those 
beliefs commits me to trusting the traditions from which I acquired them. If I 
am a little slice of history, trusting myself commits me to trusting the longer 
span of history of which I am a part. So one modification I want to make to 
Foley’s line of reasoning about self-trust is to extend it in two ways. In addition 
to trusting our faculties, procedures, and beliefs, we also need emotional self-
trust, and we need trust in traditions and historical institutions from which we 
acquire our beliefs and learn how to interpret our experience.
To trust an emotion means to have confidence that the emotion is 
appropriate for the circumstances. In my theory of emotion an emotion is an 
affective state whose intentional object is seen as falling under a distinctive 
thick affective concept, so pity is feeling pity for someone seen as pitiful, love 
is loving someone seen as lovable, contempt is feeling contempt for someone 
seen as contemptible, reverence is revering what is seen as sacred, admiration 
is admiring someone seen as admirable.6 The admirable cannot be understood 
apart from the feeling that is a component of the emotion of admiration, but 
we can say something about the admirable. I think it is something like the 
imitably attractive. We feel a positive emotion towards the person we admire 
that would lead to imitating the person given the right practical conditions. 
To trust the emotion of admiration, then, means to have confidence that it is 
appropriate to feel the kind of attraction and desire to imitate that is intrinsic 
to admiration.
Notice, however, that even though self-trust is a crucial part of any non-
skeptical life, we do not trust ourselves equally all the time, and this applies 
both to our beliefs and to our emotions. Suppose that I give up in adulthood 
a belief I had as a child. I think the later belief is better than the earlier one. 
Similarly, if I have a different emotion in a certain situation in adulthood 
than I had as a child, I think the later emotion is more appropriate. I believe 
that my older self is more trustworthy than my younger self, and I believe that 
primarily because I trust my older self more than my younger self. There are 
defenses for this attitude, but the defenses also require self-trust. For example, 
we might think that other things being equal, greater experience is more 
trustworthy than less experience, but that also is not something for which we 
have a non-circular defense.
  I also trust some of my current beliefs more than others. I trust the beliefs 
I have when carefully reflecting, considering open-mindedly contrary views, 
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treating opponents fairly, and not indulging in strong emotional reactions 
which tend to distort beliefs into extremes. So I trust beliefs arising from my 
intellectual virtues and not those arising from vices. It is probably true that 
I have a better track record of getting the truth when my beliefs are formed 
in the virtuous ways I’ve mentioned rather than in vicious ways, but there is 
still no non-circular way for me to tell that the virtuously formed beliefs are 
the reliable ones. That is because my final decision about what the truth is in 
some case is determined by what I believe when I’m being as virtuous as I can.7
I trust some of my emotions more than others for the same reason I trust 
some of my beliefs more than others. I trust the ones that are stable, do not 
change upon reflection, and which do not arise from vices. Again, there is no 
non-circular way to tell that the virtuously formed and stable emotions are 
the trustworthy ones since I need emotions to tell whether a previous emotion 
was trustworthy.
But if there are no non-circular grounds for trusting some of my beliefs 
and emotions more than others, why is it that I trust myself more in some 
circumstances than in others? The answer, I think, is that I admire myself more 
when I am behaving in an intellectually virtuous way than when I am not. 
Self-admiration is not an emotion we are comfortable with and I hesitate to 
use the term because of its connotations of vanity and conceit,8 but I think it 
is fairly obvious that if we are capable of admiring and not admiring others, we 
are capable of admiring and not admiring ourselves. We trust ourselves more 
in some of our beliefs than in others because we admire the way we came to 
believe some of our beliefs more than others. Again I want to make it clear 
that I do not treat my intellectual virtues as evidence that I am admirable and 
have grounds for trusting myself. Being trustworthy is not something I infer 
about myself in a non-circular way, nor is being admirable.
Now if I am consistent, I admire the way some people form some of their 
beliefs more than I admire the way I form some of my beliefs, and so consistency 
requires me to trust the beliefs of others formed in these ways more than my 
own when my own are not admirable. So self-trust commits me to trusting 
more than myself those who are more admirable than myself, who have the 
traits I trust in myself in a greater degree than I have myself.
This means we must reject intellectual egalitarianism. We know that there 
are people who are generally more virtuous than others in epistemic behavior. 
So my trust is not universal, and its non-universality is based on the way I 
treat trust in myself. And this explains why I do not trust those who are not 
admirable. I do not trust the beliefs of terrorists about terrorism, not because 
I have evidence of their unreliability, but because I don’t admire them. The 
difference between those we trust intellectually and those we do not cannot be 
explained by the fact that we have evidence of the reliability of the admirable 
and the unreliability of the non-admirable. So the position I am endorsing is 
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not a form of epistemic egoism.
I think, then, that Foley is right that epistemic egotism and egoism are 
incompatible with self-trust, but epistemic egalitarianism, which Foley uses 
to support epistemic universalism, must be rejected. So I differ from Foley’s 
position in two further respects: (1) I think that self-trust leads to trusting 
the people I admire more than the people I do not admire and the difference 
does not rest upon the fact that I have evidence of the greater reliability of 
the former. (2) I maintain that self-trust commits me to trusting some other 
people more than myself. I am forced to these conclusions by trusting my own 
emotion of admiration.
Now let us return to conflict in beliefs. Suppose that I trust my emotion of 
admiration of some person more than I trust a given belief I have. Maybe I do 
not admire the way I formed my own belief as much as I admire the way the 
other person formed hers. And suppose the other person’s belief conflicts with 
mine, and I am not aware of another person I admire just as much whose belief 
agrees with mine. Self-trust would lead me to trust the admired person’s belief 
more than my own. If I am able to imitate the admired person by adopting 
her belief without changing anything else about myself that I trust even more 
than I trust my admiration for her, then self-trust should lead me to change 
my belief. For example, suppose that I hastily form a belief about a recently 
published book without reading it, and then become aware of a contrary opinion 
about the book by an acquaintance whose intellectual judgment I admire and 
who has clearly made a more careful study of the book than I have. If I am not 
aware of anyone else I admire just as much whose opinion agrees with mine, 
and if I can change my belief without changing anything else about myself 
I trust more than I trust the judgment of my acquaintance, then I probably 
should change my belief.
 This seems to me the right thing to do for beliefs that are not deeply 
embedded in the self. I think, then, that Foley is mistaken in saying that self-
trust will always lead me to decide a conflict between my belief and the belief 
of another in favor of my own.
But even if I trust my admiration for another person more than I trust my 
belief, it does not always follow that I should change it. Whether I should 
change a belief is not simply determined by how much I trust the belief itself, 
but how much I trust the other aspects of myself that I would have to change if 
I changed the belief. Foley emphasizes the social construction of belief, but as 
I’ve pointed out, that commits me to trusting much more than the individual 
persons from whom I learned the belief. To trust myself commits me to trusting 
the traditions that shape me and the institutions on which I depend. Religious 
beliefs are usually connected with an entire network of other beliefs as well 
as religious emotions, experiences, communal loyalties, and connections with 
many other admirable people, all of which I trust. Admiration is an emotion 
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that leads me to imitate the admirable person in suitable circumstances, but 
often the circumstances are not suitable. So I can admire the belief system of 
a Hindu without the inclination to adopt that system for myself.
Suppose, however, that I trust my admiration for the Hindu more than I trust 
the aspects of myself I would have to change if I imitated the Hindu by adopting 
her religion. I still might not imitate her because it might not be possible. 
Just as I can admire an Olympic swimmer without the slightest inclination to 
imitate her, I can admire a devout Hindu without the inclination to imitate, 
and the reason is the same in both cases: I can’t do it. But some people can. It 
is possible to convert to another religion, and I would not accept any position 
on religious diversity that rules out conversion for the conscientious believer.
If I convert to Hinduism, there is a sense in which I can imitate the devout 
Hindu and a sense in which I cannot because what one converts to is never 
what one sees when one admires an exemplar from a radically different culture. 
When I see an admirable person with a very different belief system, I see an 
alternate self. I don’t mean that that person is an alternate self. Rather, I mean 
that I know that if I had met that person at an early age, I might have imitated 
her because then I might have trusted her more than I trusted my conflicting 
beliefs. If so, I would be a very different person today. And even now becoming 
an alternate self is still an option through conversion. So respect for admirable 
others in other religions includes recognition of an alternate self. This forever 
changes the way I relate to them. But I only get one life. I might respect the 
self I could have been, but it does not follow that I should now try to become 
that self. I might trust my alternate Hindu self more than my present self, in 
which case I should convert, but given the nature of self-trust, we would expect 
conversion on that scale to be rare, and I am arguing that that is perfectly 
compatible with conscientiousness.
In a situation in which a choice whether to convert is made, some element 
of self-trust becomes the bottom line– that to which we refer in adjudicating 
between those elements of ourselves that pull us one way and those that pull 
in another direction. Lee Yearley gives a brief but moving account of this 
process in himself while contemplating an enormous Buddha and imagining 
what it would be like to become a Buddhist. Yearley writes: –“I could imagine 
attempting to incarnate the excellences I saw in the Sokkurum Buddha that 
morning in Korea. I admired them, they tempted me, and I believe I could have 
chosen them and remained myself.  But I did not want to choose them, and 
I hoped that those about whom I most care would not choose them.” (247)9
Notice Yearley does not say he didn’t want to become a Buddhist because he 
thinks his Christian beliefs are true and Buddhist beliefs are false. Presumably, 
he did think that, but that is not sufficient to explain why he would not become 
a Buddhist. As long as it was possible for him to change his beliefs, given his 
admiration for another religion, imitation of that religion was possible. And 
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Yearley might have been conscientious if he did become a Buddhist on that 
morning in Korea. If his admiration for Buddhism had been strong enough and 
he had trusted it more than the other aspects of himself he would have had to 
change if he became a Buddhist, I think he would have been a conscientious 
believer. But he didn’t change, and his reason seems to me not only to show a 
high degree of self-knowledge, but it gives us a hint about how self-trust often 
operates. He genuinely admires Buddhism, but he does not like the self he 
would become if he converted to Buddhism, nor does he want those he loves 
the most to adopt such a self. He does not try to find some reason to reject 
Buddhism either in its doctrines or its way of life. I am assuming that he has 
already thought through the reasons and still admires Buddhism. The bottom 
line is that he doesn’t like himself as a Buddhist. He trusts that emotion, and I 
not only think that he can be conscientious in doing so, but I’ve tried to show 
that he has few other options. Whatever he does, there will be some element 
of the self to which he defers in a situation of this kind.
 The problem of this paper is therefore a conflict that arises within self-trust. 
I trust my admiration of others and my other emotions, and I trust the aspects 
of myself from which I gain my beliefs and the traditions that support them. I 
think this conflict produces a genuine problem of religious diversity. In contrast, 
the problem that arises from an assumption of intellectual egalitarianism 
seems to me to be much less threatening because I have less reason to trust 
egalitarianism than to trust my emotions. So I am not much taken with the 
well-known argument that says, “Other people are as well placed to get the 
truth as we are. There is an irresolvable conflict between their beliefs and ours. 
Hence, we have no more reason to think our beliefs are true than that their 
beliefs are true.” This is what I called the Enlightenment Worry. What I do 
take seriously is the admiration I have for alternate ways of life and the beliefs 
that go with them. I may have full confidence in my beliefs, emotions, and 
their sources in the traditions that shape me, and I am conscientious in doing 
so. But as long as I trust my emotion of admiration and admiration includes 
the urge to imitate, conversion is also compatible with conscientiousness, 
and the diversity of religions will put some people in the position of making a 
choice, a position that puts those aspects of herself she trusts the most in the 
forefront of her consciousness.
Admiration may not require me to change my beliefs, but it adds something 
to the dialogue between people with conflicting religious beliefs that did not 
exist in the pre-modern era. What it adds, I think, is the feeling that I would 
imitate them if I had grown up with a different social construction of the self. 
That prevents me from taking the line, “We’re right, so they’re wrong, and 
that’s the end of that.” Of course, we think we’re right, but there’s more to be 
said. Respect for others comes from trusting that we are right in the admiration 
we have for many people who have very different beliefs, and that logically 
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requires us to think of them as like the self I could have been if I had been 
raised in a different way.
Admiration is a tricky emotion. On the one hand, it is of central importance 
to the moral life because most of what we learn is by imitation and admiration 
is the emotion we use to distinguish those who are worthy of imitation from 
those who are not. But admiration raises the problem of the boundaries of the 
self. We would not want to imitate every admirable person in every way they 
are admirable, even if it were possible, which it isn’t. There is a domain of the 
self that does not respond by imitation even when the admiration is genuine. 
Many of our central beliefs are in that domain. The problem of conflict between 
our own beliefs and the beliefs of those we admire reflects the complexity of 
admiration. We are inclined to imitate the admirable beliefs of others, but we 
are also right to know the difference between being as admirable as we can be 
and trying to become another person.
University of Oklahoma
Footnotes
1John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. See Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, 
1996) for a recent interpretation of Locke’s epistemology.
2 I have argued elsewhere that the ability to sense the important affects the 
ethics of belief and blurs the lines between moral and intellectual exemplars. 
See “Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About,” in Immoral 
Believing (special issue of Philosophical Papers, edited by Ward Jones, 2005.
3 The ethical analogues play no role in either Foley’s argument or mine, but I 
mention them because they are interesting.
4 Foley has said in conversation that he has changed his mind about the conflict 
situation.
5Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chap. 19, “Faith and reason.” 
See also Locke’s Discourse of Miracles.
6 For a fuller account of this theory of emotion, see “Emotion and Moral 
Judgment,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January 2003, pp. 104-124, 
and Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 2.
7 I am not suggesting that truth is defined as what I believe when I am being 
as careful as I can.
8An alternate is “self-approval,” but that term does not capture the aspect of 
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a tendency to imitate, which I think is included in admiration. We want to 
imitate our better selves as well as admirable others.
9Yearley, L., “Conflicts among ideals of human flourishing,” in Outka, G. & 
Reeder, J., Jr. (eds.) Prospects for a Common Morality (Princeton University 
Press, 1993), pp. 231-253.
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